The curious economics of duplication.
The discussion around duplication at the IFA/HMRC/HMT Annual Conference left me wondering how readily we distinguish between the duplication of an activity and the duplication of its economic benefit. Two people performing ostensibly the same function may be serving quite different commercial purposes.
Multinational businesses rarely organise themselves with the OECD Guidelines open on the desk. Centralised and decentralised functions often coexist for perfectly legitimate commercial reasons, although explaining their respective contributions can prove somewhat inconvenient during a tax audit.
Ronald Coase's 1937 essay, The Nature of the Firm, offers an interesting starting point. Coase was concerned with why firms exist in the first place, given the possibility of procuring goods and services through the market. His argument rested, in part, on the costs associated with transacting. I wonder whether a similarly useful question could be asked about the internal organisation of multinational businesses: why do certain activities remain local when the infrastructure to perform them centrally already exists?
Consider an international retailer with marketing teams operating at global, regional and local levels. The global team develops the brand strategy, the regional team interprets it in the context of regional consumer behaviour, and the local team determines how best to reach its customers. All three may spend their Monday mornings discussing marketing. What follows from those conversations, however, may be economically quite different.
Paragraph 7.11 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines already recognises this difficulty. The proposed revisions to Chapter VII, published in June 2026, develop the analysis further. Paragraph 7.33 draws attention to the purpose, scope, specificity and duration of the activities under examination, rather than simply their functional description.
I find the distinction particularly relevant in regulated industries. A financial services group may operate a sophisticated central risk management function whilst maintaining comparable capabilities within its local entities. Local regulatory obligations, differences in market exposure and the need for independent oversight may explain why both exist. The presence of one does not necessarily diminish the commercial importance of the other.
Of course, businesses are also perfectly capable of organising themselves inefficiently. The existence of several teams performing similar activities may reflect historical acquisitions, internal politics or an organisational restructuring that has been in progress for considerably longer than anyone anticipated.
The arm's length principle does not, however, require multinational enterprises to achieve a level of organisational efficiency rarely encountered among independent businesses. The relevant question remains whether the recipient obtains a benefit for which an independent enterprise in comparable circumstances would be willing to pay or incur its own costs.
There is a separate question, explicitly recognised in paragraph 7.34 of the OECD consultation draft, concerning whether the same underlying expenditure has been charged more than once. Establishing that two activities serve distinct economic purposes does not establish that the corresponding charging arrangements are appropriate.
Artificial intelligence may introduce a further complication. As central teams develop automated analytical capabilities, local teams may increasingly perform activities that appear to replicate the outputs of those systems. Whether their role constitutes unnecessary duplication or provides commercially valuable independent verification will depend, among other things, on the reliability of the technology and the consequences of getting things wrong.
I suspect that some of the more interesting functional interviews in the coming years will concern activities that businesses could automate but have deliberately chosen not to.
Organisational efficiency is considerably easier to assess from an organisational chart than from within an organisation.
That TP Lady.
All views expressed are my own. This article does not constitute tax advice.
Sources
- Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), Economica, Vol. 4, No. 16.
- OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2022), Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.6 and 7.11.
- OECD Public Consultation: Revisions to Chapter VII, June 2026, paragraphs 7.32–7.34.
- HMRC International Manual, INTM440060.
