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In Conversation with That TP Lady18 Nov 2026

Transfer pricing under communism: An interview with my grandfather

Minimalist black and acid-yellow editorial cover featuring a simplified freight train on railway tracks above the four-stage industrial supply chain: Procurement, Logistics, Warehouse/Storage and Distribution.

An unusual functional analysis of a Romanian state-owned raw-materials distributor.

Transfer pricing under communism. An unusual subject for the first interview on a transfer pricing platform, although perhaps an appropriate way to introduce That TP Lady.

They say the apple never falls far from the tree. In my family, it appears to have landed somewhere between cost accounting, transfer pricing and business strategy.

My grandfather began his professional life as an accountant and spent approximately thirty years progressing within the same organisation, eventually reaching a position equivalent to Chief Financial Officer. He worked in Romania’s state-owned technical-material supply system, which subsequently evolved into the COMAT wholesale distribution network. Its responsibilities included the procurement, storage and distribution of raw materials, construction materials and industrial supplies.

Several decades later, I find myself working in transfer pricing in London, concerned with many of the same economic questions, albeit within a considerably different institutional framework. The geographical and historical distance is substantial, but the similarities in the underlying accounting and commercial considerations are rather more interesting than I had anticipated.

That TP Lady is an independent platform for transfer pricing professionals, bringing together technical discussions, experimentation with artificial intelligence, editorial perspectives and professional development. Within its Read section, I have created two editorial series. The TP Lady Edit is where I explore questions that have occupied my thinking, whilst In Conversation with That TP Lady is an opportunity to speak to people whose experiences, perspectives and professional judgement I believe deserve closer examination.

The intention behind the latter is to understand how people and businesses actually operate, rather than confining our understanding to the descriptions found in organisational charts, annual reports or, indeed, transfer pricing documentation. Some conversations will involve established practitioners and senior stakeholders in international tax. Others will concern people working in industries and professions that offer a different perspective on familiar economic questions. My grandfather seemed an appropriate person with whom to begin.

I appreciate that applying the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines retrospectively to communist Romania is a creative exercise. We are comparing two fundamentally different economic systems, particularly in their treatment of ownership, competition, pricing and commercial decision-making. I also make no claim to be an expert in socialist economics, and some of my understanding will inevitably reflect the limitations of historical research and personal recollection. Nevertheless, the parallels in the analytical questions are difficult to ignore. What functions did an enterprise perform? Which assets did it employ? How were costs attributed and financial results measured? Most interestingly, who exercised control over economically significant risks when so many decisions were determined by the state?

I therefore approached our conversation with something resembling a functional interview agenda, expecting to learn about my grandfather’s career and perhaps explore a few analogies with contemporary transfer pricing. What emerged was a rather interesting examination of the distinction between performing an economic activity, controlling the decisions associated with it and being held accountable for the resulting financial performance.

The business model: how Romania organised its industrial supply chain

My grandfather’s employer did not manufacture cement or steel. It sat between the factories that made those materials and the businesses that needed them. That sounds like a fairly conventional wholesale distributor until one asks who decided what the factories produced, which customers received their output and how much anyone could charge. In communist Romania, those decisions were closely tied to the national economic plan.

The country’s industrial capacity was organised through ministries, industrial centrale and manufacturing enterprises. The State Planning Committee helped prepare the production and investment plans, which set targets for factories producing steel, cement, chemicals, machinery and other industrial goods. To make those targets achievable, planners also had to account for the materials each producer would consume. A factory could be instructed to manufacture a particular quantity of output, but it still needed fuel, components, machinery and construction materials to do so. This was the purpose of balanțe materiale, or material balances: an attempt to match the goods expected to be available with the needs of industry, construction, exports and other planned uses.

The next problem was geographical. Romania’s factories were not conveniently located beside every business that needed their products, and customers did not all require quantities large enough to justify a direct delivery from a major producer. A construction company in one county might need reinforcing steel or cement in relatively modest consignments, whilst the producer supplied materials in much larger volumes. The solution included a network of county technical-material supply bases, known as Baze Județene de Aprovizionare Tehnico-Materială (BJATM). They procured, received, stored and distributed industrial materials for customers in their areas. Historical records from COMAT Cluj and COMAT Caraș-Severin trace their predecessor organisations to county supply bases established in 1973. After 1989, many of these organisations were reorganised as wholesale distribution companies operating under the COMAT name.

A county supply base had to understand local demand, secure deliveries from producers and maintain the depots from which customers were supplied. The 1971 legislation even dealt with orders smaller than a full railway wagonload. A steelworks could send out heavy consignments, whilst a building contractor might need only a few tonnes of reinforcement for the next stage of a project. Between them sat the county base, receiving, storing and dividing materials into usable quantities. The railway wagon is a useful detail: it tells us more about the distribution business than a formal description of its responsibilities ever could.

The factory produced the goods, the county base got them to customers, and the state determined much of the production programme, investment and pricing framework. My grandfather’s financial results depended on all three. That is what makes the business interesting to examine through a transfer pricing lens: a single set of accounts recorded the outcome of decisions taken across several organisations.

Procurement: getting the materials the county actually needed

“The producer knew exactly how much to make. And I could see what was needed in my county.”

My grandfather recalled visiting producers each year, usually between September and November, to arrange supplies for the following period. The meetings were practical. He knew what the industrial and construction customers in his county needed; the producers knew their production targets and the quantities they had been instructed to supply. When a manufacturer told him, in effect, I can give you this much, his next task was to work out where the rest might come from.

Take reinforcing steel. A factory’s planned output might already have been committed to particular industrial or construction requirements, including projects accorded priority under the national plan. It was not a matter of my grandfather offering a higher price to secure an additional wagonload. The producer’s selling price had been set within the state pricing system, and the allocation of scarce materials was subject to administrative rules. If a county required more than its initial allocation, the distributor had to investigate other producers or the mechanisms available for securing and redistributing supplies. The legislation allowed for reserves, the movement of surplus stocks and adjustments when additional resources became available. It did not create an unrestricted market for whatever was left over.

Supplier location therefore mattered more than one might initially expect. My grandfather recalled choosing the closest practical source where possible, because the purchase price was only part of the calculation. He still had to get tonnes of cement, steel or other materials to the distribution base and, ultimately, to customers. Freight over a longer distance increased the cost of delivering exactly the same product. The 1971 technical-material supply rules expressly encouraged the use of nearby producers to reduce unnecessary transport. Good procurement, in this context, meant understanding availability and the economics of moving materials, not simply negotiating the lowest invoice price.

My grandfather’s experience made me think about how procurement works in multinational businesses today. We can spend considerable time establishing where purchasing decisions are made, yet the most revealing conversations are often with the people dealing with suppliers, shortages and delivery costs. They know which arrangements work in practice, where the difficulties arise and how much judgement goes into keeping a supply chain running. That was knowledge my grandfather had built through repeated visits to producers and years of arranging supplies for his county.

Warehouses, railway sidings and the cost of moving a tonne

The county distribution bases needed physical infrastructure to perform that work. Warehouses and depots allowed them to receive large consignments, keep materials until customers needed them and arrange deliveries in smaller quantities. The legislation contemplated intervention stocks and the redistribution of excess inventory, as well as responsibilities for packaging, handling and the organisation of storage. These were not incidental tasks. They were the operating conditions of a business handling industrial goods that were heavy, awkward to move and often needed at a specific stage of a construction or manufacturing project.

Rail freight was central to the wider system. Industrial facilities and supply bases could have dedicated railway sidings connected to the national network, enabling wagons to reach their own loading and unloading areas. Romania’s regulations dealt with loading capacity, the time wagons spent waiting and the equipment required to handle them. Evidence survives of a railway connection associated with the former technical-material supply infrastructure in Iași, although I have not yet established precisely which facilities my grandfather’s organisation used, whether it owned them or when they were built.

The operational significance is clear even without those details. Imagine receiving a wagon of reinforcing steel at a county depot. Somebody must arrange its arrival, unload it, account for the goods, provide storage and organise the quantities required by different customers. The railway connection, warehouse, handling equipment and staff all have costs. So do delays, unnecessary movements and a consignment sitting in the wrong place when a customer needs it elsewhere. My grandfather’s account of calculating expenses per tonne makes considerably more sense against this background: a regulated producer’s price was only the beginning of the financial calculation.

I would like to know who decided to build those facilities. Under Romania’s planning system, major investments and the use of investment funds were subject to state approval. My grandfather’s enterprise might have run a depot, maintained its equipment and borne some of the everyday costs whilst the investment decision had been taken elsewhere. That matters when assessing its financial position. The costs of operating a railway-connected warehouse are visible in the accounts; the authority to build or expand it may be much harder to locate.

Risk: the difference between responsibility and control

“We always had to be profitable. Every activity. The state was watching.”

My grandfather remembered the financial discipline clearly. Beneficiu, the financial surplus recorded by the enterprise, was an important plan indicator, alongside turnover, sales volumes, revenue and costs. He also recalled that the achievement of plan indicators affected his salary. Whatever the limits of management’s autonomy, the enterprise’s results mattered to the people running it.

Suppose the local steel producer fell short of its allocation. My grandfather would need to find the missing quantity, perhaps from a factory farther away. That could mean additional freight expenditure, more handling and pressure on the county base’s financial targets. He could manage the response, but the shortage began with a production or allocation decision outside his enterprise. I am interested in that gap between the decisions a manager could make and the results for which he was held responsible.

Consider inventory. The county base might receive and store the materials, record their movement and arrange delivery to customers. But we cannot conclude from that alone who bore the loss if goods were damaged, who could authorise their redistribution or what happened financially when too much stock accumulated. Similar questions arise over transport. Could additional freight expenditure be recovered through the permitted cotă, or did it reduce beneficiu? If a railway wagon was delayed, who carried the cost of the delay? Until we understand the actual rules and accounts, it would be too easy to assign risk on the basis of who physically handled the goods.

The shortages of the 1980s made these questions more than theoretical. My grandfather recalled periods when export priorities left little output available for domestic distribution. His numerical recollections of the proportion exported should be checked against other evidence before being treated as national statistics, but the wider pattern of shortages is well documented. A distributor could remain responsible for warehouses, staff and financial targets even when the materials it was expected to distribute were not available in sufficient quantities. Assessing its profitability without considering those constraints would tell only part of the story.

The modern OECD risk analysis gives us a way of asking more precise questions about these events. Who decided how to respond to the shortage? Who paid for the longer journey? What happened if the warehouse was left underused because the expected materials never arrived? Those answers would tell us considerably more about the enterprise’s economic position than its designation as a state-owned distributor.

Remuneration: the 20%, the 10% and a rather important denominator

“The profit was not called profit. It was called beneficiu.”

This is the part of the interview that I suspect will interest transfer pricing readers most. My grandfather described signing supply contracts at the producer’s regulated price and then calculating a commercial addition, or cotă, to reflect the cost of distribution and an intended profit. His calculation took account of transport, labour, operating expenses, depreciation and costs per tonne. He remembers a profit margin of 20% being included when calculating the cotă. In another part of our conversation, he referred to a ministry-prescribed cotă of around 10%, which could vary according to the distance from suppliers. His notes also associate a figure of 5%–10% with profit tax and distance-related costs, a point I would want to clarify before drawing any conclusion about the applicable tax or surcharge.

I initially assumed the two percentages contradicted one another. On revisiting my notes, I am less certain. The 20% could have been a profit component included in a calculation, whilst the 10% may have referred to a prescribed addition applied to a different base. They could also relate to different products or periods. Romania’s legislation recognised commercial additions and beneficiu, but the notes do not yet allow me to reconstruct my grandfather’s calculation. I rather wish I had asked him to write it down.

The denominator is crucial. Suppose, purely to illustrate the arithmetic, that a distributor buys materials for 100 monetary units and incurs 10 in distribution expenses. A 10% addition to the purchase price produces 10 units, which would cover the expenses in this example but leave no further surplus. A 20% mark-up on the 10 units of distribution expenses produces only 2 units of profit, requiring 12 units in total to cover those expenses and provide that return. The figures are not equivalent, and neither calculation can be attributed to my grandfather’s enterprise without knowing the actual rules. A percentage described simply as a “margin” is not much use until we know what it is a percentage of.

The business’s large sales volumes make this especially relevant. The price of steel or industrial equipment could account for most of the value passing through the distributor’s accounts, even though the economic activity performed locally was concerned with obtaining, storing and delivering the goods. A mark-up applied to the full purchase value would produce a very different result from a return on warehousing, transport and administrative costs. The treatment of equipment sales and depreciation, which my grandfather also mentioned, may add another difference between the revenue recorded and the costs of the distribution function.

The historical cotă belonged to an administered pricing system; an OECD cost-plus analysis would ask a different set of questions about the cost base and the return earned. Yet my grandfather has already given me the beginnings of a familiar meeting agenda: what exactly went into the 20%, and what was the denominator? I suspect those questions would have sounded less mysterious to him than they do in some contemporary benchmarking discussions.

The professional relationships that kept the system working

“Each county organised the meetings in turn.”

My grandfather recalled meetings of representatives from the county supply organisations, hosted by different counties in turn. I was struck by the amount of contact this implied between people working across the same distribution network. The plan might establish an allocation of steel, but the people arranging its delivery still needed to know whether a factory could fulfil the order, who could explain a delay and where an alternative source might be found.

Those meetings may have provided a way to share information about producers, delays and the practical difficulties facing neighbouring counties. I would like to ask him more about what was discussed and how those relationships affected the work. They cannot be taken as evidence that anyone could bypass formal allocations. But an experienced colleague in another county might well know something about a supplier that had yet to reach the paperwork on my grandfather’s desk.

What matters to me is how much useful knowledge sits outside the documents. My grandfather spent thirty years in the same organisation, beginning in accounting and eventually reaching the equivalent of CFO. By then, his understanding of the business would have extended well beyond the accounts. He knew the supply cycle, the producers, the physical constraints on moving materials and the way a change in sourcing could affect profitability. It is one thing to see that transport costs have increased; it is another to know that the local steel producer could not meet an allocation and that the alternative required a much longer journey.

I recognise this from my own work in London. A transfer pricing file may contain a careful functional analysis and detailed financial schedules, but a conversation with the person responsible for procurement or warehousing can change how I read them. They can explain why a supplier was chosen, why freight costs rose or what happened when an expected delivery failed. My grandfather had spent a career acquiring precisely that kind of knowledge. His professional relationships mattered because they helped him understand the business behind the numbers, a habit I would like to think we share.

What would the functional analysis conclude?

My grandfather’s enterprise coordinated supplies, found alternatives when allocations fell short, ran storage and distribution facilities and managed the cost of moving industrial materials. Its senior staff were answerable for financial targets, including beneficiu. Production plans, producer prices and major investment decisions, meanwhile, involved ministries, planners and manufacturing organisations. The enterprise’s accounts brought together the effect of activities and decisions spread across that entire system.

Could it be described as a limited-risk distributor? I am not ready to make that call. I still need to know who owned the inventory, how losses were financed and whether additional freight expenses reduced the enterprise’s beneficiu. Nor can I identify a single entrepreneurial principal simply by writing ‘the state’ at the top of an organisational chart. The ministries, planning authorities, factories and county bases performed different roles, and the financial consequences of their decisions deserve the same attention as the decisions themselves.

Then comes the benchmarking exercise: administered prices, priority allocations, substantial warehousing and rail logistics, and two percentages for which I have yet to establish the calculation bases. I have seen considerably simpler fact patterns generate prolonged discussions about comparability. The temptation to settle on cost plus 5% is familiar, but the OECD’s simplified approach for low value-adding intra-group services was not designed for wholesale distribution of industrial materials. My grandfather spent thirty years calculating costs per tonne; I suspect he would want to see the calculation before agreeing to the mark-up.

A final observation

I approached this interview conscious that I was applying a modern analytical framework to an economic system for which it had never been designed. My understanding of socialist economics remains incomplete, and some aspects of the institutional arrangements may have been lost in the passage of time or misunderstood in our conversation. The article should therefore be read as a creative exercise informed by personal recollections and historical research, rather than a definitive account of how Romanian state enterprises operated.

It was also undertaken for a reason considerably more personal than methodological curiosity. I wanted to learn more about the professional life of my grandfather, whose experience of accounting, industrial distribution and financial management developed in circumstances very different from those I encounter working in transfer pricing in London. The fact that we arrived at related economic questions through different generations, geographies and institutional systems made the conversation particularly enjoyable.

Towards the end of our discussion, I asked him whether, looking back, he considered the system in which he worked to have been efficient.

“It was the system we had. You worked within it. You made it work as well as it could work. That was the job.”

His answer has stayed with me. He described a system with its own targets, shortages and rules, and the considerable amount of work required to keep goods moving through it. I had approached the conversation looking for an unusual transfer pricing analogy; I came away with a much clearer sense of the job he had actually done.

My grandfather has offered to sit for a second interview if I need to clarify anything. Given my outstanding questions about inventory ownership, railway infrastructure and the relationship between the 20% margin and the 10% cotă, I may have to take him up on it. This time, I might bring a calculator and ask him to show me the workings.

I suspect he has not yet appreciated the full implications of making himself available to a transfer pricing practitioner.

That TP Lady.

Editorial note: This article combines personal recollections, historical research and a retrospective application of contemporary transfer pricing concepts. The 20%, 10% and 5%–10% figures are reported as interview recollections, not independently verified statutory rates or comparable profit margins. Their calculation bases and precise relationship require confirmation.

Sources

  1. Romania, Decree No. 303/1971 Concerning technical-material supply, county distribution bases, warehousing and transport optimisation.
  2. Romania, Law No. 8/1972 Concerning economic planning, material balances and supply priorities.
  3. Romania, Law No. 19/1971 Concerning regulated prices, costs, beneficiu and commercial additions.
  4. Romania, Law No. 5/1978 Concerning industrial management and enterprise responsibilities.
  5. Romania, Government Decision No. 425/1975 Concerning industrial railway infrastructure and freight-handling arrangements.
  6. COMAT Cluj, company history Documenting the development of a county technical-material supply base.
  7. International Monetary Fund, The Romanian Economic Reform Program (1991) Historical analysis of Romania’s centrally planned economic system.
  8. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2022) Chapters I and II and Chapter VII, Section D.